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HOW I TE ACH
By Donald H. Zeigler

2007/08 marks my thirtieth year of law teaching.
My colleagues suggested that I write a paper describing how I teach, explaining the techniques and
practices that contribute to what success I have had in
the classroom. Some parts of the paper have been
hard to write; other parts have been easy. I realized I
hadn’t reflected on how I teach for a long time. I just
do it. Years ago I read a book by Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi entitled “Flow, The Psychology of
Optimal Experience.”1 His description of being “in
the flow” is what I experience when I teach. I am in
the moment, fully engaged. Csikszentmihalyi writes:
When all a person’s relevant skills are needed to
cope with the challenges of a situation, that person’s attention is completely absorbed by the
1

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow, The Psychology of Optimal
Experience (Harper Perennial 1990).
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activity. . . . People become so involved in what they
are doing that the activity becomes spontaneous,
almost automatic; they stop being aware of themselves as separate from the actions they are
performing. . . . We feel in control of our actions,
masters of our own fate. On the . . . occasions when
it happens, we feel a sense of exhilaration, a deep
sense of enjoyment that is long cherished and that
becomes a landmark in memory for what life
should be like.2

I can’t fully describe how this happens. Being “in the
flow” in the classroom involves for me many different
components—painstaking preparation of a specific
kind, interacting with the students so they feel comfortable becoming engaged in the intellectual inquiry,
challenging the students without threatening them. I
teach with urgency. I pour out energy. If I don’t appear
to be caught up in what I am teaching, the students
are not likely to find it interesting. Energy and enthusiasm also implicitly convey the message that the
enterprise is important.
I think it best to begin this paper with the parts of
teaching that are easiest to describe; namely, the
mechanics of preparation and the many little things
I do to try to create a professional atmosphere in
the classroom. After I’ve discussed these essential
building blocks, I will attempt to describe the
more subjective, ephemeral, emotional parts of my
teaching.
2

Id. at 3, 53.
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d
I . G etti n g S ta rte d
I teach Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Federal Courts,
which are core doctrinal courses. Civil Procedure and
Evidence usually are large classes with 100 students or
more. I use the traditional case method. The textbooks
I assign are filled with court opinions, linked together
with short introductions and narratives and followed
by notes and questions. I attempt to create a version of
the so-called Socratic dialogue. I ask questions about
the cases, followed by additional leading questions
designed to guide students in recognizing the important points in the cases.3
The first class is important because it sets the tone
for the semester. I want the students to see immediately that I am prepared and well-organized. The
materials for the course—textbook, authors’ annual
supplement, my syllabus, and any additional supplements I have prepared—are completed and available.
I tell the students I will begin with administrative,
housekeeping matters and then spend the balance of
the class presenting hypotheticals to introduce them
3

I recognize that there has been much innovation in legal education in
the last thirty years—the clinical movement, the professionalization
of legal writing instruction, and the burgeoning use of computers and
related technology, to mention a few of the main innovations. I
applaud all of these developments because they have greatly enriched
the curriculum and enhanced student learning. Students learn in different ways, and different teaching methods help insure that more
students receive effective instruction. Variety in teaching methods
also makes law school more interesting. Law school would be intolerably tedious if all professors taught exactly the same way.

3

to some of the main themes in the course. I briefly
discuss the class materials, explain how to read the
syllabus,4 and give the students the assignment for the
next class.5 I give them my office hours and my email
address. I tell the students the exam format and invite
them later in the semester to view online past essay
questions and the accompanying “A+” student answers.
In Civil Procedure, a first-year, first-semester course, I
also include hints on how to approach law study, how
to use hornbooks and commercial outlines (as a supplement to, not a substitute for, assigned reading), and
I ask them to read New York Law School’s “Student
Conduct: Expectations and Guidelines.” In short, I
convey necessary information and, hopefully, convey
the impression that I know what I am doing.
4

5

Law school textbooks, particularly in required or core doctrinal
courses, generally provide comprehensive coverage of the subject they
cover. Inevitably, the texts contain much more material than can reasonably be covered in a three- or four-credit course. The authors hope
that by being comprehensive more professors will choose the text
because they all will find the topics they wish to teach in the textbook.
Professors thus are compelled to pick and choose what to assign. I
assign relatively few pages, but I expect the students to read those
pages very carefully. My syllabi are quite detailed, designating the
cases and the specific notes and questions to be read. I leave out whole
chapters, and I also leave out individual cases in chapters I do cover
and many notes and questions following cases that I assign. I tell students the syllabus is so long because I’ve left so much out!
When the semester gets underway, I give the students the assignments
for all the classes (usually two) the following week so they can prepare
over the weekend if they wish to. Night students, in particular, find
this helpful. I do not include dates on the syllabus, or designate the
pages we will cover for each class. Although I know from past years
approximately what I will cover each class, because the class is interactive I can’t be sure exactly how far I will get. To designate material
for each class on the syllabus and then be forced to change the assignment makes a professor look disorganized.

4

I don’t assign case readings for the first class. In
Civil Procedure I assign an introductory narrative in
the text about the stages of civil litigation. In upperclass courses I don’t assign anything at all. In all of
my classes, I spend the first class asking questions
about short hypothetical fact patterns that raise some
of the main issues or themes of the course. In upperclass courses students often have not finalized their
schedules by the first class. They may drop one course
and add another, so they have not yet bought textbooks. Consequently, if I give an assignment from the
textbook, a large portion of the class will be unprepared. I believe I have a better chance of engaging the
whole class with hypotheticals. Particularly in Civil
Procedure, I make the beginning hypotheticals quite
easy to encourage students to participate and to ensure
that they get positive reinforcement.

d
I I . P r epa r i n g f o r C l ass
For me, careful and detailed preparation is essential to
the success of the enterprise. My preparation materials
are not simply “class notes,” in the sense of an outline for
the day, or a list of points I want to cover, or insights
about the cases that I want to share with the students.
My class materials are more focused and specific. I write
down all of the questions that I plan to ask the students
about each case. I put the answer to the question in
parentheses following the question, mainly so I won’t
5

have to puzzle over the answer the next year if I
forget the answer in the interim. In addition, unless the
question is a straightforward factual question—“How
much money does the plaintiff seek in damages?”—
I include a list of back-up, leading questions to ask when
the main question elicits only silence and blank stares.
I also write the short introductions and transitions from
one case or section of the text to the next. I call my
materials “scripts.” While I’m not expecting the preset, verbatim dialogue of a theatrical presentation, I tend
to ask the main and back-up questions as I have written
them, and I hope to evoke answers that are reasonably
close to the answers I have written.
This sort of detailed preparation has several benefits.
First, it forces me to decide exactly how I want to
organize the discussion of each case. I tend to use a fairly
standard, logical format. What are the facts, what are
the issues, what does the plaintiff argue on each issue,
what does the defendant argue, which argument does
the court accept and why, and then what are the
implications of the court’s decision? Many court opinions follow this format and many don’t. For those that
don’t, I often ask questions that will reorganize the
discussion in the more standard format if I think that
format will enhance student understanding. This often
requires saying to the students, “Drawing your attention
to the second paragraph on page 35,” or “Returning
now to page 32,” before asking a question.
A second benefit of this approach is that it requires
me to read very carefully. Forcing myself to write
6

down the answers to my questions means that I must
specifically identify the material facts, articulate the
plaintiff’s arguments, and so on. When I simply read
through a complicated opinion in an area of my
expertise, I understand it. I see the main outlines. But
I often feel like I’m looking at a picture that is a little
out of focus, at least in some parts. As I write the
questions and answers for class, the entire picture—
the whole opinion—comes into much clearer focus.
A third benefit of this approach is that it often
allows me to have insights into a case that I would
not have had simply from reading the case over once
or twice. In the course of writing down the questions
and answers, I see flaws in logic, gaps in reasoning.
I see a court distorting precedent or making a major
doctrinal change seem like a small step. When I see
these things, I then can write additional questions to
help the students draw these more sophisticated points
of analysis from the case.
Finally, as the students answer the questions, the
opinion comes into clearer focus for them as well.
Law students, and particularly first-year law students,
do not have the knowledge and experience necessary
to understand court opinions. In addition, they often
do not read cases carefully. Consequently, students
often come to class with only the vaguest idea of what
a case is about or why it is in the text. By being led so
specifically through the details of a case, including the
more sophisticated points of analysis, they come away
with a sense they have learned something. Often, of
7

course, what they learn is that the court has announced
a fuzzy, ambiguous legal standard that is difficult to
apply. Students don’t like ambiguity. Most believe
they came to law school to learn black-letter law.
Convincing them to embrace uncertainty is not easy.
But if they at least know a court adopted a new,
three-factor test, and what those factors are, and
specifically how each factor was applied in this case,
they feel they have something to hold onto.
I provide an example of a “script” in the Appendix
(page 39) that helps demonstrate the benefits of the
detailed preparation I do. I chose a relatively straightforward case about personal jurisdiction, a subject
that most readers may remember from their Civil
Procedure class or from law practice. The traditional
rule allowed a state to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant only if the defendant was a resident of
the state, was present in the state and served with process, or consented to jurisdiction. In 1945, International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 6 replaced the rigid traditional
rule with a new, qualitative, subjective standard—the
famous (or infamous) minimum contacts test. Shoe
held that a state could exercise jurisdiction over a
non-resident if the defendant had sufficient contacts
with the state to make it fair and reasonable to hear
the case. Shoe gave a green light to the expansion of
personal jurisdiction, and in the years following many
states enacted so-called “long-arm” statutes to take
advantage of the relaxed standards. Early long-arm
6

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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statutes generally addressed cases where the non-resident defendant committed a single act or conducted
only isolated activity in the forum state, but the cause
of action arose from that activity.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.,7 a 1961 Illinois case, posed one of the vexing
questions raised by the tort arm of the new long-arm
statutes. The Illinois statute authorized jurisdiction
over a non-resident who either in person or through
an agent commits a tortious act within Illinois. The
authors of the statute presumably had in mind a case
where someone physically present in the state committed a tort, as when a non-resident motorist drove into
Illinois and had an accident involving the automobile.
Gray posed a somewhat different situation. Titan Valve,
an Ohio company, manufactured a safety valve that it
sent to American Radiator in Pennsylvania. American
Radiator incorporated the valve into a water heater
that it sent in the course of commerce to Illinois.
Phyllis Gray bought the water heater in Illinois and it
exploded, causing her injury. Titan Valve was named
as a defendant and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion and Gray
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Q&A I wrote for the case initially follows the
standard format. I ask questions to bring out the facts
and procedural details, the key language of the longarm statute, and the two issues that, kindly, the court
explicitly states—whether Titan committed a tortious
7

22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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act within the state within the meaning of the statute
and whether the statute, if so construed, would violate due process. I ask “What does Titan contend on
the first issue?” (Titan contends that the tortious act
occurred in Ohio, where the valve was negligently
manufactured, rather than in Illinois, where the injury
occurred.) I ask “What does the court hold on issue
No. 1, and why?” (The court holds that the tortious
act occurred in Illinois because without an injury
there is no tortious act. The court also infers that the
tort occurred in Illinois because the statute of limitations runs from the time of the injury.) As to issue
No. 2, the court does not explain the defendant’s
argument that exercising jurisdiction would deny it
due process, so I have the students explain, using
back-up questions designed to focus on Titan’s paucity of Illinois contacts. (“What exactly is the extent
of Titan’s contact with Illinois, according to the proof
submitted in the case? If you were Titan’s lawyer, how
would you use International Shoe to argue for dismissal?”) Finally, I ask “What does the court hold on
the constitutional issue and why?” (Jurisdictional
requirements have been relaxed and jurisdiction is
secure if the act or transaction itself has some connection with the forum state.)
At this point the case, and the Q&A, take an unusual
turn. In the excerpted version of the case in my textbook,
the court takes two and one-half pages to conduct the
analysis summarized above and to conclude jurisdiction exists. The court continues to write, however, for
10

another three pages that seem, at first, to be rambling
and repetitive. As I pondered the questions I wanted
to write about these pages, I saw a subtext in the
opinion that I had not seen just reading the opinion
through. It became clear the court was very uneasy
with its analysis in the first half of the opinion,
although it never said so explicitly. Ultimately, the
court makes up facts so that it feels more comfortable
asserting jurisdiction.
The problems begin when the court discusses
precedent, particularly its own prior decision in Nelson
v. Miller,8 which the court cites as supporting its decision in Gray. I ask the student to tell me the facts of
Nelson. The defendant in that case, a Wisconsin resident, sold appliances. In the course of delivering a
stove in Illinois, an employee of the defendant was
involved in an accident and negligently injured the
plaintiff. I then ask how Nelson is different from
Gray, with backup questions that focus on the earlier
disagreement between the parties in Gray as to where
the tortious act occurred. (Could the defendant in
Nelson make the same argument Titan made in Gray
about the tortious act occurring outside Illinois?
No, because in Nelson, both the negligent act and the
consequences occurred in Illinois, while in Gray the
negligent manufacture occurred in Ohio, and only the
injury occurred in Illinois.) Subsequent questions bring
out that the defendant’s contacts with the forum are
much greater in Nelson. The defendant in Nelson
8

11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
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purposely availed itself of the benefits and protections
of the forum in ways Titan did not.
At this point students often begin to look perplexed,
particularly when I point out that the court nowhere
acknowledges the important factual differences
between Nelson and Gray. But I suggest the court is
nonetheless troubled by the differences. To support this
suggestion, I specifically direct the students to a paragraph where the court says the following:
While the record does not disclose the volume of
Titan’s business or the territory in which appliances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a
reasonable inference that its commercial transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in
substantial use and consumption in this State. . . .
[Titan] enjoys benefits from the laws of this State,
and it has undoubtedly benefited (sic), to a degree,
from the protection which our law has given to the
marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves.

I ask the students what the court is doing, and through
leading questions bring out that the court is making up
facts not in the record. I explain that I believe the court
took this unusual step because it was uneasy asserting
jurisdiction without additional contacts between Titan
and Illinois beyond those in the record. I also point out
that the students will soon see long-arm statutes, like
New York’s, that explicitly require additional contacts
in “act without, consequences within” cases.
Preparing the scripts makes every class well-organized.
The scripts provide an anchor that helps keep the class
12

firmly on track. The progression of thoughts is very
specifically planned. I always know what I am going to
ask next. There are no down periods. I proceed briskly
for 75 or 100 minutes class9 after class all semester long.
On the rare occasions when we finish the assigned
material early and I come to the end of the script I say
“We finished early. That’s all for today!” Students
never seem disappointed when that happens.
At the same time, having the script makes me more
comfortable with elaborations or digressions. When a
student asks an interesting question, but one that is
slightly off track, I’m comfortable saying “That’s a
good question!” or “I’m glad you asked that.”
Sometimes I just answer the question; more often, I
turn it back on the class, making up back-up questions as necessary to lead them to the answer. I know
the class is not going to end up wandering in the wilderness because when the sidetrack comes to an end, I
can return to the script and ask the next question.
When a student asks a question that leaps ahead to
point that I know is coming up later, I say “I want to
hold that question, we’ll get to it.” And then I always
do get to it, because it is in the script. I think the
students appreciate that their questions don’t get lost
in the shuffle. It also is not uncommon to have a
9

I teach a 75 minute class straight through, but usually take a 10 minute
break in a 100 minute class. Seventy-five minutes seem to go by fairly
quickly; my energy level remains high and the students seem engaged.
Without a break, however, the final 25 minutes of a 100 minute class
seem to drag. With the break, I tell the students to think of class as
two 50-minute classes. Taking a break also cuts down on students
leaving during class to go to the bathroom.
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student ask the question that is the very next question
in the script. I find this heartening, because it shows
the student is with me; the student sees where this line
of questioning is going. I usually say “Good question!
In fact, that is the very next question in my notes
here!” That makes the student feel good, and turns
the question back on the class and we proceed.
The courses I teach involve many different substantive areas of law, and that makes class preparation
more difficult. In a torts class, every case is a torts
case; in a contracts class, every case is a contracts case.
In Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Federal Courts,
however, we get quite a mix—torts, contracts, trusts
and estates, shareholders derivative actions, tax, corporations, labor, and criminal law. In preparing to
teach a case that involves a substantive area where I
have little knowledge, I make sure I learn enough to
understand the facts and the legal arguments. I and
the students need to know enough about the substantive law to make sure the underlying jurisdictional or
federalism or evidentiary issue isn’t obscured.
One venerable Civil Procedure case, for example,
concerns whether notice by publication of a pending
judicial settlement of accounts given to beneficiaries
of small trust estates pooled into a common trust
fund violates due process.10 The case is a bear and
there is no way to avoid the details of the formation
and supervision of common trust funds if the students
10

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
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are to understand what the Supreme Court holds
about notice. What notice to the beneficiaries is reasonable depends on how their interests are affected by
the judicial settlement of accounts. Students can
answer some questions from a careful reading of the
case; other points I have to tell them. The students
must be given a basic definition of trust, trustee, and
beneficiary. Small trusts that cannot afford the
expenses of capable corporate fiduciaries can band
together to achieve diversification of risk and economy of management. Periodically the trustee must
petition the surrogate’s court for a settlement of
accounts. One effect of the settlement is to extinguish
any right of a participating trust or beneficiary to
challenge the performance of the trustee during the
accounting period. Thus, if the trustee has violated its
fiduciary responsibilities, the beneficiaries will lose
the chance to challenge the violation. Once this basic
factual and legal structure is clarified, the students
can understand the Court’s decision about what notice
of the pending settlement beneficiaries should receive.
Beneficiaries whose addresses are known must receive
notice of the proposed settlement by mail; those who
addresses (or whose identities) are not known can be
served by publication. Interests are balanced. Trustee
are not unduly burdened; common trust funds can
continue to exist; beneficiaries who receive notice
can act on behalf of those who do not receive notice if
the situation warrants action. In preparing to teach
this case and others like it, I do not learn more than
15

I need to about the substantive law. I also don’t want
the students to get diverted from the procedural point
by unnecessary substantive details.

d
I I I . Co n d u cti n g the C l ass
A. Playing Socr ates

I practice my own version of the Socratic method.
Like most law professors, I have a seating chart and
call on people from the chart. Each day I attempt to
call on people in different parts of the room to keep
students on their toes. I try to call on enough students
in each class so that other students will believe there
is a realistic possibility they might be called on in the
next class, thus giving the students an extra incentive
to prepare. When I call on people, I generally ask
them relatively easy, straight-forward questions that
someone who has read the case should be able to
answer. When teaching Gray, for example, I call on
students for the facts, the wording of the long-arm
statute, and the two issues listed by the court. I call
on students who don’t usually participate in class discussion. I hope they will be able to answer correctly
and will be encouraged to participate further as the
class progresses. The students often do participate
further, although the participation usually does not
carry over to subsequent classes.
If student says “I’m unprepared,” I simply ask another
student the question. The unprepared student is already
16

mortified and there is no need to linger and add to the
distress. (I do make a point, however, of calling on
the unprepared student in the next class.) I generally
move next to the students immediately around the
unprepared student. I hope when that pattern becomes
clear, the surrounding students will be ready when I
call on one of them and the class can move along. If a
student does not say “unprepared,” but is nonetheless
struggling to answer, I wait a little while, but not too
long, before moving to another student. At that point
the first student is almost always staring intently at
the textbook, trying to find the answer. I want to give
the student a fair chance to answer—to find the text
of the long-arm statute or read the two issues listed
by the court. But if I wait too long, the student usually freezes up. The student is embarrassed and can’t
think. The rest of the class becomes tense and feels
sorry for the student, saying to themselves “That
could be me!” There is no point in asking back-up
questions because the main question is usually factual
and straightforward—“What relief does the plaintiff
seek?” “What are the words of the statute?” The
better course, I think, is to move to another student.
For all but the easy questions, I ask the group and
take volunteers. In Gray, for example, I ask the class
“What does the defendant contend on issue No. 1?”
(The defendant contends the tort took place in Ohio,
where the valve was manufactured.) I could call on an
individual to answer that question, but I know many
students won’t be able to answer it. If the volunteer
17

appears to know the answer but does not articulate
the answer clearly or fully, I often say, “Yes, but could
you explain more fully?” or “Could you elaborate?”
After the student elaborates, I almost always repeat
the answer, for two reasons. I say it better, and the
whole class can hear me. Unless the volunteer is one
of those rare students who speaks in a loud, clear,
booming voice, only a small portion of the class has
heard the student’s answer.
When a volunteer gives an incorrect or incomplete
answer to a question and back-up questions are appropriate, traditional practice is to stay with that student
and ask the back-up questions, leading the student
eventually to the correct answer. I rarely do that. I
gently say “No, that’s not quite right” or “That’s a
good point (or an interesting point), but not quite
what the defendant is arguing.” I then call on another
volunteer. If the second or third volunteer doesn’t
answer correctly, I begin asking back-up questions,
again to the entire group. Usually, as a group, the
class can answer the back-up questions and someone
articulates the correct answer to the main question.
Sometimes I will stay with the first student, usually
when the student has given a partially correct answer
and I think the student can complete the answer.
For example, if I ask “What does the defendant
contend on issue No. 1?” and the student responds
“The tort did not take place in Illinois.” I will ask the
same student “Where does the defendant contend
the tort took place? Why?” Generally, however, if
18

a student gives an incorrect answer I turn to the
group for the answer.
I look to the group instead of staying with an
individual student for several reasons. First, I’ve
found that if a student give a wrong answer to the
main question, the student usually can’t answer
the back-up questions successfully. Perhaps if we were
in my office one-on-one, the student could answer
the back-up questions. With 100 fellow students
looking on, however, most students get that deer-inthe-headlights look and freeze. If I stay with
that student, asking question after question without
a coherent response, the student gets upset and the
class gets upset. Second, leading one student through
a series of questions, even if partly successful, often
is like pulling teeth. It is slow going. There are
long pauses. The atmosphere of the class changes
as the pace changes. The rest of the class go from
participating to observing. Third, there are many
countervailing positive benefits to making questionanswering a group effort. When the class is going
well, most people are participating, either actively
by volunteering or at least trying to answer the
questions in their minds. The pace is brisk. When
a student answers incorrectly, I call on another very
quickly. There is no penalty for a wrong answer. The
student is not separated or isolated. The class is
working together to answer the question. The students are cooperating, not competing. As individuals,
most of the students can’t answer most of the
19

questions. As a group, they can answer almost all of
them. The group is successful. The class is fast-paced,
upbeat, positive.
There are pitfalls in this approach that I try to avoid.
A group approach is most successful when a lot of
students participate. If the same eight people answer
all the questions, the rest of group become observers.
If not enough people volunteer, I begin calling on
more people with the in-between questions that I
could ask an individual or the group. I will say, “Let’s
get more people involved here, “and ask a back-up
question that may get more hands in the air. I also
must be careful not to jump away from a volunteer
too quickly. The first sentence out of the student’s
mouth may be a bit garbled or fragmentary; the
student actually may know the answer and be able to
state it if given a few more seconds. In addition, if the
class gets going too fast, students become confused.
They get lost. After a sequence of group answers to
questions and back up questions, I restate. In large
classrooms, students always have trouble hearing, and
rapid or partial student answers are hard to follow.
I’ll say, “Did everybody get that point?” “The court
is saying there isn’t actually a tort or a tortious act
unless a person is injured. The tort isn’t complete.
Therefore, the court concludes the tort occurred
in Illinois because that is where Phyllis Gray was
injured.” My restatement pauses the class, and,
hopefully, ensures that almost everyone understands
the court’s reasoning. Then, I proceed with more
20

questions and back-up questions to the group and
we move ahead briskly until the next pause
and restatement.
A final problem with calling on volunteers is that
some students repeatedly volunteer but rarely provide
a correct answer. As a semester proceeds, it quickly
becomes clear which students fit into this group.
In the worst cases, other students roll their eyes or
almost audibly groan when I call on students in
this group. I deal with this situation by rarely calling
on the problem students. I call on them occasionally
so they won’t feel completely marginalized. I usually
call on them to answer relatively easy questions to
increase the chances they will give a correct answer.
Most classes seem comfortable with this practice. I
think most of the other students understand exactly
what I’m doing.
B. Answering Student Questions

Some students ask terrific questions that are interesting, insightful, and give me an opportunity to explain
an important point more fully or to expound on a
related point. Other students raise their hands when
they don’t understand what I’ve just said. If the student is a good student and he doesn’t understand,
chances are good that many other students also don’t
understand, so the question tells me I should restate
the point or explain more fully.
On the other hand, I have learned there are some points
I should not explain too many times because my
21

explanation seems to become less coherent with each
repetition. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson,11 the Supreme Court redefined “foreseeability” for personal jurisdiction purposes. To be subject
to jurisdiction, a manufacturer must foresee being
haled into court in the forum state, not merely foresee
that their product might reach the forum state. A
manufacturer should foresee being haled into court if
their product reaches the forum state in the stream of
commerce (which seems to mean the wholesale chain
of distribution), but not if the product reaches the
state by the unilateral actions of a consumer bringing
it there after purchasing the product somewhere else.
In World-Wide, an allegedly defective Audi automobile left the stream of commerce when the plaintiffs
purchased it in New York. The plaintiffs subsequently
drove the car to Oklahoma, where an accident
occurred. The New York retailer and the New York,
New Jersey, and Connecticut distributor of Audis did
no direct business in Oklahoma. Since the plaintiffs’
car reached the forum state through the plaintiffs’
actions and not in the stream of commerce, the Court
held there was no jurisdiction in Oklahoma over these
parties. Students have trouble understanding this redefinition of foreseeability, particularly when different
factual examples are presented. For reasons I don’t
fully understand, if I try to explain the redefinition
too many times, confusion grows rather than lessens.
So I explain it twice and then stop.
11

444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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Unfortunately, some students ask questions that are
only marginally relevant or don’t make much sense.
As with problem volunteers, these students make themselves known fairly quickly, and I call on them only
occasionally. In my introductory remarks in the first
class, I encourage students to ask questions, but I also
say: “I will answer as many questions as I can. If you
have your hand raised and I don’t call on you, don’t
take it personally. I often can’t answer all of the questions from a group this size. When I pass you over, it
simply reflects my judgment that it is time to move on
so we can cover the assigned material for the day.”
I’m speaking truthfully when I say this, but the disclaimer also provides a convenient cover for passing
over students who don’t ask good questions.
Sometimes a student asks a question and I don’t
know the answer. This situation arises more than I
might like because, as I explained above, many of the
courses I teach involve so many different substantive
areas of law. Particularly in Civil Procedure, students
ask questions about the substantive law or other issues
that are simply not relevant to the procedural issues at
hand. It is important to slip such questions quickly
and get back on track so the class is not diverted from
the relevant points or confused. In Pennoyer v. Neff,12
the granddaddy of all jurisdiction cases, for example,
Mitchell sued Neff in an Oregon state court for breach
of contract. Neff was served by publication, never got
notice, and a default judgment was entered against
12

95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
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him. When Neff subsequently acquired some real
property in Oregon, Mitchell had the property sold at
auction to satisfy the judgment. The point of the case
is that Oregon had neither personal jurisdiction over
Neff under existing standards nor jurisdiction quasiin-rem because Neff didn’t own the land until after
judgment was entered. Students often ask questions
about the auction process—How was the land seized?
How did the auction work? Since the land was worth
more than the judgment, what happened to the excess?
and so on. I, of course, don’t know the procedures for
enforcement of judgments in Oregon in the 1860s. I
generally say, “I don’t really know, and I don’t want
to get into those questions because they will divert us
from the central points in this case.”
When students ask questions about substantive
areas of law where I know little, I don’t hesitate to say
I don’t know. There is nothing wrong with signaling
students that I’m not a walking encyclopedia of legal
doctrine. (Indeed, I sum up my knowledge of the
world as follows: I know a lot about a few things, a
little bit about a few more things, and absolutely nothing about everything else.) I often leaven the “I don’t
know” with humor. I make comments like “When I
took torts back in 1910. . . ,” or “We have now
exhausted my knowledge of federal labor law.”
When a student asks a relevant question and I think I
know the answer, I answer it. That sounds straightforward, but there can be peril. Sometimes when I am part
way through confidently laying out the rules on some
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subject, a little alarm will go off in my head and a
voice will say, “Don, those might be the rules. That
would be a good set of rules. Perhaps those should be
the rules. But you don’t actually know if those are the
rules.” At that point I begin to backtrack. I usually
end by saying “I think that’s the right answer, but I
will check it out.” I generally write myself a quick note
in class so I don’t forget the question. It is important to
follow up, find the answer, and report back. Finding
the answer—or finding there is no answer or that the
answer is very complicated—usually doesn’t take long.
I start with the simplest method of legal research—ask
somebody who knows. A colleague can almost always
give me the answer or enough information to make
some intelligent comments on the question next class.
C. Setting the Tone

The general tone of the class is set largely by the
mechanics of my question and answer format and my
version of the Socratic method. The pace is brisk;
when the class is going well the students are engaged
in the group effort of answering the questions and
understanding the material. Students, I think, do not
feel much tension or stress; they don’t feel threatened
or in danger of being humiliated. The atmosphere is
friendly, but business-like, professional. The class is
not overly formal, nor is it informal. While I try to
adopt a friendly demeanor, I am careful to maintain
a certain distance. I’m not their friend; I’m their
professor. I call students by their last names. Almost
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 aradoxically, because each class is well-planned and
p
I’m so clearly in charge, I can be fairly relaxed. I’m
not tense, I’m not worried or uptight. Students aren’t
trying to challenge me or put me on the defensive. At
base, careful preparation is essential to achieve a good
classroom atmosphere.
As the semester moves on, I regularly attempt to
lighten the mood. I usually wait several weeks until
I’m sure I’ve “got them,” the class patterns are set,
and the atmosphere is good. I begin by making what I
hope are humorous asides, perhaps making fun of the
facts of a case, or telling a brief joke that relates to the
case or subject we are studying. Humor helps keep
the students alert and engaged. Laughter wakes people up. Despite my acting as though the material we
are discussing is scintillating, students get bored. The
energy level of the class dips as we fight our way
through some complex doctrine. Humor, often unexpected, helps get the energy level back up. Humor is
particularly important in night classes. Most of the
students have worked during the day and they are
tired. They run on the energy I pour out. Every ten or
fifteen minutes I try to say something funny or silly to
keep them awake.
Jokes don’t always come easy in the classes I teach,
except perhaps for Evidence. A high proportion of
Evidence cases involve either sex or violence or both.
This cannot be said of the cases in Civil Procedure or
Federal Courts. Consequently, if I come up with a
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funny line or a good joke, I tend to use it year after
year. There are some pitfalls in repeating jokes. Some
jokes over time become politically incorrect. Obviously
I avoid jokes that are off-color or that would offend
people. The problem is more subtle. A joke that in
1995 seemed harmless by 2005 may seem not quite
right in light of evolving social norms. I’ve dropped
several jokes over the years on these grounds. Jokes
also become dated. The average day student entering
law school in the Fall of 2007 was born in 1985 and
didn’t become marginally sentient until 1993 or 1995.
I teach a case in Evidence captioned Bill v. Farm
Bureau Life.13 Mr. Bill’s son hung himself in a neighbor’s
barn. The insurance company declined to pay on a
policy insuring the son’s life, claiming the death was a
suicide, not an accident. For many years one of the TV
networks has aired a comedy program called Saturday
Night Live. One of the comedy skits was about a little
white dough boy called Mr. Bill. Each week Mr. Bill
would get beaten up or torn apart by some character
talking in a high squeaky voice. In the course of teaching Bill v. Farm Bureau Life, I would break into a
high squeaky voice and say “Mr. Bill! Mr. Bill! Your
son is dead!” This always got a big laugh, as the students made the connection to the television show.
Then, one year, only a few people laughed and everyone else got a “What is this guy’s problem?” look on
their faces. It clearly was time to retire that joke!
13

254 Iowa 1215, 119 N.W.2d 768 (1963).
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The most reliable jokes are ones that grow from the
facts of a case, do not require any outside knowledge,
and carry no risk of offense. Another Evidence case,
McAndrews v. Leonard,14 provides a good example.
Surgeons removed a circular portion of plaintiff’s
skull to relieve pressure on the brain. The issue at trial
was whether the tissue that grew over the opening
was as hard as bone or was a softer substance. The
appeals court upheld a trial court decision to let the
jurors probe the substance with their fingers to assess
how hard it was. While the jurors were not competent
to assess the substance scientifically, the jurors were
competent to distinguish between hard and soft. In
mimicking jurors pushing on the plaintiff’s skull with
their thumbs, I pretend one of my thumbs plunges
into the plaintiff’s head. I pull it out with effort and
hold it up, grimacing as though it is covered with
blood, and say “Oh, sorry!” This is slapstick; it’s silly.
But the joke only takes ten seconds and it always has
the desired effect. It catches students completely by
surprise; some laugh, some groan and shake their
heads. Everyone wakes up.
A teacher’s efforts to maintain a positive, professional
atmosphere can be jeopardized by disruptive students.
The culprits are almost always a group of young men
who sit in the back of the class and talk to each other
a little too often and a little too loudly. I’ve only faced
this problem a couple of times in my years of teaching.
14

99 Vt. 512, 134 A. 710 (1926).
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Again, careful preparation, a brisk pace, and being in
charge help keep students from misbehaving. Being a
man also helps; my sense is that my female colleagues
face this problem more often than my male colleagues.
The best response, I think, is to try to nip the problem in the bud by calling the students aside after class
and telling them I find their behavior disruptive and
distracting and I want them to stop. I must confess,
however, that the couple of times I faced the problem
I didn’t talk to the students, seeking to avoid confrontation. In one class, my distress soured the tone as the
semester went on. The irony was that when one of the
culprits, a very good student it turned out, came to my
office to talk to me late in the semester and I mentioned
that the constant talking had bothered me, he was
mortified. I should have said something early on.
The overall tone of a class is also affected by how
the professor deals with politics. I am politically
engaged and have strong feelings on a wide range partisan political issues. I am more a pragmatist than an
ideologue these days, but my politics are definitely left
of center, particularly since the center has moved so
far to the right. Overtly political issues come up most
often in my Federal Courts class. In area after area,
the Supreme Court has erected myriad barriers that
deny litigants any effective relief for violation of their
constitutional and statutory rights. I don’t hide my
views, but I always bring out the arguments on the
other side, either in the opinions of the justices or by
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asking the class, “What’s the argument on the other
side?” I don’t feel a need to be personally neutral.
These are not small children whose minds I’m going
to warp by taking a partisan position. I do want the
students to know, however, that they are entitled to
hold and express views contrary to mine.
In Federal Courts I generally find it more interesting
to put the overtly political aspects of Supreme Court
decisions to one side and focus instead on the inconsistent or incoherent aspects of the Justices’ opinions.
Reaching a desired result often entails ignoring or distorting past precedent, relying on faulty logic, ignoring
reality, or saying things that just don’t make any
sense. I try to be even-handed in my criticism of these
practices, whether the opinion was written by a conser
vative or a liberal justice. Often decisions have elements
that do—or should—upset people on both sides of
the political spectrum. Boyle v. United Technologies15
is one of my favorite examples of this phenomenon.
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor,
and Kennedy. David Boyle, a marine helicopter pilot,
drowned when his helicopter crashed in the Atlantic
Ocean during a training exercise. His father brought
a diversity action in federal district court against
Sikorsky Helicopter, the manufacturer of the aircraft,
asserting two claims under Virginia tort law. Mr. Boyle
won a substantial verdict in the trial court, but the
15

487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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Fourth Circuit reversed. As to one claim, the Circuit
held Mr. Boyle had not satisfied one of his burdens
under Virginia law; as to the other claim, the court
applied a new federal common law defense for military
contractors. The elements of the defense are relatively
easy to satisfy, and the court held Sikorsky had satisfied them. The Supreme Court ratified the creation of
the new defense and affirmed. A clearer example of
judicial activism is hard to find, and it is an activism
that offends both separation of powers and federalism
principles. Congress, rather than the federal courts,
usually legislates federal right and defenses, and, under
the Erie doctrine, state law generally governs tort claims
and defenses. To make matters worse, Congress had
on six separate occasions declined to enact legislation
creating a special defense for military contractors.16
Liberals, who have tended to favor judicial activism
when they liked the rights and duties being created,
are brought up short by this decision. Here judicial
activism is being used to leave Mr. Boyle without any
remedy for the death of his son due to Sikorsky’s
shoddy helicopter design. Conservatives face a similar
dilemma. While they tend to favor restriction of tort
remedies and fear any decisions that might interfere
with the military, these ends are accomplished in
Boyle by trampling on separation of powers and federalism principles conservatives purport to hold dear.
16

See id. at 515 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(listing legislation that
Congress has refused to pass for government contractors).
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D. Respecting the Students

On class evaluation forms, my students almost universally say I am very respectful of them. I think that’s
true. I never say that in so many words, of course. So
how do I convey that impression? On reflection, I
think it happens in a number of ways. Perhaps most
directly, I try to be pleasant and polite. When students
talk to me, I listen. I make eye contact. I try to be
responsive. I don’t make fun of them when they give
wrong answers or make strange comments. I don’t act
bored or detached or as though I would rather be
someplace else. I also think my careful planning and
preparation conveys respect. My evaluation forms
show that students understand that I am well-prepared
and organized. I’m not wasting their time. Every class
they are challenged to participate, to engage, and they
are given important insights into the assigned material.
The implicit message is that they are worth the effort.
Along the same line, I always dress up for class. I
always wear a coat and tie. It is only in recent times
that I have let myself dress down from a suit to a
sports jacket and slacks. I was 32 years old my first
year of teaching. My first class was 120 night students, almost all of whom were older than me. I
dressed up as a defensive measure. I thought that I
better look like a lawyer. As the years went by I didn’t
need the suit anymore, but I kept wearing it anyway,
to signal that the class is important. Teaching is what
I do. It is important to me. The material is important;
the students are important.
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I have high expectations of the students, and I think
that implicitly signals respect. High expectations
imply the students are smart enough to perform at a
high level. Some of the material is very difficult. I
expect them to read carefully. I ask hard questions.
The group has got to come up with the answer. I think
high expectations are particularly important at New
York Law School or at any school that is not at the
top in the U.S. News survey. Many of our students
are insecure and have a lot of self doubts. They didn’t
get straight “A” grades in college. Their LSATs put
them in the middle of the pack. I imagine many students say to themselves, “Here I am at New York Law
School. Is this place any good? Am I smart enough to
be a lawyer?” I want the students to understand and
to believe that this is a real law school class. It’s run
the way a law school class is supposed to be run. They
are reading the same textbook that students are reading at Harvard and NYU. I’m asking the same
questions that are being asked at those schools, and I
expect NYLS students to answer them. The implicit,
but clear, message is that I respect them.

d
I V. E x a m s
My exams are a mix of objective (multiple choice and
true false) questions and essay questions. In grading
the essays, I use a number system. I put numbers in
the margin as I read, “1s” for statement of legal rules,
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“2s” and “3s” for points of analysis. When I reach the
end of the answer, I total the numbers. I use this system
for two reasons. First, it is difficult to be consistent
over a period of weeks grading 200 bluebooks. My
mood changes; I get worn down. I can always tell an
“A” from a “C”, but can I reliably distinguish between
a “B–” and a “C+” on a read through? While using
numbers hardly makes the grading objective, I do
think a number system makes grading more consistent. Second, having numbers in the margins suggests
to students reviewing their exams that I have read the
exams carefully. I remember as a student being suspicious when a professor wrote “C+” at the top of the
exam and there was not a mark on it. For the same
reason, I also try to scribble a few comments or questions on the weaker exams. When students come to
review their exams, I talk with them about my general impressions based on the numbers and the
comments, and I send them away with a copy of the
essay question, their bluebook, and a copy of an “A”
or “A+” answer. I direct them to reread the question,
read their answer, read the “A+” and compare and
contrast the two answers carefully. Most of the students see and understand the differences between
their paper and the “A+.” In my essays I am looking
for even-handed and thorough analysis. On the one
hand, on the other hand, and in great detail. Weak
exams don’t argue from both sides and are conclusory.
I doubt that comparing their exam with an “A+”
actually teaches the weaker students how to do
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e ven-handed, thorough analysis. But I think most
students understand the differences in the paper,
which makes the weaker students more content with
their lower grade.

d
V. B ei n g “ I n the F low ”
Being “in the flow” while I teach has several distinct
characteristics. I am totally focused on the class and
am not conscious of my self. Time passes differently
than it passes ordinarily. I feel very strong. I feel
creative. When a class is going particularly well, I
feel a deep sense of satisfaction.
In my daily life, I am not particularly good at focusing or concentrating on a single subject or task. I
function; I can plant my tomatoes or write this paragraph. But my thoughts tend to jump around, from
one subject to another. I’ve never been good at meditation. I can’t clear my mind of all thoughts or
concentrate on one single object for more than ten or
fifteen seconds. When I teach, by contrast, I concentrate solely on the subject we are discussing and on
the interaction with the students. My mind does not
jump around to the myriad other matters that crowd
my mind normally. I don’t watch myself teach. I just
do it. It that sense I am not self-conscious when I
teach. As Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi puts it:
[L]oss of self-consciousness does not involve loss
of self, and certainly not a loss of consciousness,
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but rather, only a loss of consciousness of the self.
What slips below the threshold of awareness is the
concept of self, the information we use to represent
to ourselves who we are. And being able to forget
temporarily who we are seems to be very enjoyable. When not preoccupied with ourselves, we
actually have a chance to expand the concept of
who we are.17

Time passes differently than it does ordinarily. It goes
by very fast. I’m not unaware of time when I teach.
My classrooms have a large, easily readable clock on
the wall. I need to be aware how much time I am
spending on a topic so I don’t fall behind. But I am
always a bit surprised when I realize 30 or 40 minutes
have gone by in what seems like no time at all.
I feel strong when I teach. I am neither bored nor
anxious. I feel secure; not threatened. My classes have
clear goals. Once the semester gets going, the ground
rules are clear. I am able to meet the challenges I will
face in the class, and as a group, the students are able
to meet the challenges they face. In my daily life I feel
strong sometimes, weak other times. Like everyone I
have my insecurities and vulnerabilities. But in class, I
feel strong.
I often feel creative in class. I believe this is possible
because class is interactive. Even though I am teaching a case or topic that I have taught many times, the
student answers to my questions are different each
17 Csikszentmihalyi, supra n. 1, at 64.
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time. Exactly what back-up questions are appropriate
depends on how the students have responded to the
main question. I also do quite a lot of spontaneous
Q&A, either in response to student questions or to
try to drive points home when it is clear the class does
not fully understand the material. These new
exchanges with students emulate the Q&A in the
script, but because they are spontaneous, I am creating as I go.
I have a sense of well-being when I teach. I believe
what I am doing has real worth. I’m the center of
attention. I can tell that the students appreciate my
teaching, which of course makes me feel good. Who
doesn’t like to be liked? I feel a deep sense of
satisfaction.

d
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A P P E ND I X
Civil Procedure
Class # 5
Introduction

We have been tracing the doctrinal evolution of
jurisdictional basis. In 1945 in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, the Supreme Court made some major
changes in the relatively rigid Pennoyer framework by
adopting the so-called minimum contacts test. This
test requires that to subject a non-resident individual
or corporation to suit, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. The new test is qualitative,
not quantitative. It does not depend merely upon
adding up the contacts in a mechanical way. Rather,
it involves weighing and analyzing the nature and
quality of the non-resident defendant’s relationship
with the forum to determine whether it is fair and
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reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
Shoe also suggests that in applying the test, courts
should assess whether the defendant has purposefully
conducted activities in forum, thus availing himself of
the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum.
Shoe also suggested a series of rough categories to
use as a starting point for analysis. If the non-resident
is involved in systematic and continuous activity
within the forum, and the cause of action arises from
that activity, it is almost always reasonable for a court
to exercise jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the nonresident commits only an isolated act or conducts only
occasional business in the forum, and the cause of action
is unrelated to that activity, courts generally should
not exercise jurisdiction. In the middle categories—
the defendant conducts systematic and continuous
activity in the forum but the cause of action is
unrelated to that activity, and the defendant conducts
sporadic or isolated activity in the forum but the
cause of action arises from the activity—courts will
sometimes exercise jurisdiction and sometimes not.
Today we begin our discussion of state long-arm
statutes. As the brief discussion in the text makes
clear, legislatures as well as courts get involved
in defining the circumstances in which courts
may properly exercise jurisdiction. The United States
Supreme Court sets the constitutional limits. The
states, through their legislatures and courts, then
define the circumstances under which the courts
of the state may exercise jurisdiction, within
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constitutional limits. The name “long-arm statute” is
based on the idea that the statute extends a court’s
jurisdiction. The court reaches its long arm out across
the country, grabs a defendant, and brings him back
to the forum.
In the 1950s and 1960s, many state legislatures
enacted long-arm statutes, seeking to take advantage
of the expanded personal jurisdiction allowed by
International Shoe. The original long-arm statutes
were an elaboration on one of the Shoe categories.
The statutes applied in cases where the defendant
committed a single act—or only isolated activity—in
the forum, but the cause of action arose from that
activity. This category is one of the in-between
categories where jurisdiction is only sometimes
allowed. Legislatures sought to differentiate between
the “yes” and “no.” Some legislatures wrote very
lengthy statutes that sought to specify all of the
different kinds of cases where jurisdiction would be
allowed. Other legislatures, wanting to maximize
state jurisdiction, simply said jurisdiction should be
exercised in any case where it does not exceed
federal constitutional limits. A third group of states,
like Illinois and New York, took a middle approach.
They wrote statutes that gave some general guidance
in major categories of cases, such as tort cases and
contract cases. Gray v. American Radiator is a 1961
case involving the Illinois long-arm statute. It is very
helpful in introducing you to the kind of issues that
arise under the middle group of long-arm statutes.
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Gr ay v. American R adiator p. 83

What are the facts of Gray?
(Titan Valve manufactured a valve in Ohio. American
Radiator incorporated the valve into a water heater in
Pennsylvania. In the course of commerce, the water
heater was sold in Illinois to Phyllis Gray, where it
exploded, injuring her. Ms. Gray sued Titan Valve for
damages in the Illinois Circuit Court—a trial court—
which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
trial court also dismissed the crossclaim of American
Radiator against Titan, which left American Radiator
and “others” as the defendants. American Radiator
had filed the crossclaim against Titan seeking indemnification by Titan if it was found liable because Titan
had made certain warranties to American Radiator.
Plaintiff Gray appealed the dismissal as to Titan. The
Illinois Supreme Court said that because a constitutional issue was involved, the plaintiff was correct to
appeal directly to the Supreme Court instead of going
first to an intermediate appellate court.)
Extra:

—Who were the parties to the lawsuit? Where was
each located?
—Where did the valve start out? How did it get
to Illinois?
—What was American Radiator’s position in all of this?
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—What does American Radiator mean when it claims
it should be indemnified by Titan? [Note: Put states
and parties on board:
Gray—IL Titan—OH American Radiator—PA
and put an arrow from OH to PA and from PA to IL]
The plaintiff is suing under the Illinois long-arm statute.
What is the key language of the statute that the
plaintiff says authorizes jurisdiction?
(Section 17(b)(1) of the statute says that a nonresident
who, either in person or through an agent, commits a
tortious act within the State submits to jurisdiction.)
What does the Court identify as the issues in the case?
(Page 83, bottom: “The questions in this case are (1)
whether a tortious act was committed here, within
the meaning of the statute, despite the fact that Titan
corporation has no agent in Illinois; and (2) whether
the statute, if so construed, violates due process.”)
 hat does the defendant contend as to issue No. 1?
W
(1) the wrong occurred in the place of manufacture,
which is Ohio. Only the consequences took place in
Illinois; and (2) “tortious act” refers only to the act or
conduct, separate and apart from any consequences.
Extra:

—How does Titan interpret the phrase “tortious act?”
—Where did the tort occur according to Titan? Why?
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What does the court hold on issue No. 1? Why?
(The tortious act took place in Illinois (1) because the
consequences occurred here; namely, the water heater
exploded here. Court says on page 84, “To be tortious
an act must cause injury.” Thus, without the injury, no
tortious act. (2) the statute of limitations runs from the
time the injury occurs, from which we can infer that
the tort occurs at the time of injury.)
Extra:

—Where did the tort or tortious act occur, according to
the court?
—How do we know the tort occurred in Illinois?
—Why is the court talking about the statute of
limitations?
—What is a statute of limitations? (A statute that
specifies how long a person has to sue.)
—How is the statute of limitations relevant to when
the tort occurred? (Statute runs from when the
injury occurs, not from the time of negligent manufacture. From this the court infers the tort occurs at
the time of injury.)
What is the defendant’s contention as to issue No. 2?
How or why would holding Titan subject to jurisdiction
under the Illinois long-arm statute violate due process?
(Basically, Titan says it lacks sufficient contacts with
Illinois to make assertion of jurisdiction over it
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reasonable under the Shoe test. Titan says its only
contact with Illinois is that its valve happened to end
up in Illinois after passing through Pennsylvania.
There is no proof that Titan has ever done any other
business in Illinois, directly or indirectly.)
Extra:

—What exactly is the extent of Titan’s contact with
Illinois, according to the proof submitted in this case?
—Assume you are the lawyer for Titan: How would
you use International Shoe to argue for dismissal?
What is the court’s response to this argument?
(No due process violation).
Why not?
The court says, middle page 85:
We do not think, however, that doing a given
volume of business is the only way in which a
nonresident can form the required connection
with this State. Since the International Shoe
case was decided the requirements for jurisdiction have been further relaxed, so that at the
present time it is sufficient if the act or transaction itself has a substantial connection with
the State of the forum.
Extra:

—What does the court say has happened to the law
governing jurisdiction since Shoe was decided?
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So, the court concludes that we have a tortious act
within the state within the meaning of the state long-arm
statute, and that exercising jurisdiction on the facts of
this case does not violate constitutional standards.
Now, you will notice that the court took about two
pages to conduct this analysis and decide that jurisdiction exists. But the opinion continues for another
two-and-a-half pages. The court has decided the case.
Why does it continue to write? Why doesn’t the opinion just end? Sometimes, of course, opinions go on
and on because judges are long-winded. It is not as
though there is an official court editor that comes into
chambers and says “Judge, this is too long. Shorten
it.” But I think something else is going on here, that
there are other reasons why the court keeps on going,
and I would like to explore those reasons now.
The court turns to precedent, mentioning several cases,
including its own prior case, Nelson v. Miller. I want to
examine Nelson now, and see if it is really on point.
What are the facts of Nelson?
(Defendant, a Wisconsin resident, sold appliances. In
the course of delivering a stove in Illinois, an employee
of the defendant was involved in an accident with the
plaintiff and negligently caused the plaintiff injury.)
How are those facts different from the Gray facts?
(In Gray, no agent or employee of Titan delivered the
stove into Illinois. In Gray, the negligent act occurred
outside Illinois, and only the consequences, the injury,
46

occurred in Illinois. In Nelson, the negligent act and
the injury both occurred in Illinois. The whole tort
occurred in Illinois, lock, stock, and barrel.)
Extra:

Focus on the disagreement between the parties in Gray
as to where the tortious act occurred.
—Could the defendant in Nelson make the same
argument that the defendant made in Gray about
the tortious act occurring outside Illiniois?
—Why not?
Which case, Nelson or Gray, involves greater contact
between the defendant and Illinois?
(Nelson, clearly, because the defendant’s agent came
into the state and while here did the negligent act that
hurt the plaintiff. In Gray, no agent of Titan came
into the state. Titan did whatever it did wrong in
Ohio, and then sent the valve off to Pennsylvania.)
In which case, Nelson or Gray, did the defendant do
more to purposely avail itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of Illinois?
(In Nelson, clearly. The defendant knowingly and
purposely sent his agent into Illinois with a stove. In
Gray, Titan only sent a valve to Pennsylvania, maybe
knowing its valve might end up in Illinois or not.)
Extra:

—Focus on the word “purposely.”
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Note: The court also cites Smyth v. Twin State Im-

provement Corp., a Vermont case we discussed earlier. As a precedent, Smyth poses the same problems
as Nelson. In Smyth, remember, plaintiff, who lived in
Vermont, sued a nonresident roofer a defective roofing job on his home in Vermont. Thus, in Smyth, as in
Nelson, both the negligent act and the consequences
occurred in the forum.
So, we have an interesting situation here. The court
is relying on precedents that are clearly distinguishable from the case before it. And the court does not
explicitly acknowledge the differences between Nelson
and Smyth, on the one hand, and Gray on the other.
Nonetheless, I think the court actually does see the
differences and recognizes that there are a lot more
contacts in Nelson and Smyth than in Gray, and I
think the court is concerned about the differences.
Why do I think that? Well, let me draw your attention to the top of page 87.
What does the court do in the first paragraph on
page 87?
(The court presumes that a lot of Titan valves end up in
Illinois, and from that the court concludes Titan enjoys
the benefits of the Illinois market. It also presumes
Titan knows that some of its valves put in water heaters in Pennsylvania will end up in Illinois.)
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Extra:

—What did the record show about the volume of Titan’s
business or where appliances containing Titan valves
are marketed? (Nothing)
—So what does the court do about that deficiency
in the record, or deficiency in plaintiff’s proof?
(It makes facts up. The court says “It is a reasonable inference that [Titan’s] commercial transactions,
like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this state.”
—And what does the court then infer from those made
up facts?
Note: The normal rule is that an appellate court is

r estricted in deciding an appeal to the facts that appear
in the record of the case that it receives from the lower
court. A party can’t come to the argument before the
Illinois Supreme Court and say, “Judges, I’m sorry, but
I have some additional evidence I forgot to introduce
in the trial court and I would like to introduce it now.”
And appellate judges are surely not supposed to say,
“Oh, there are some facts missing that I wish were
in the record so I’ll just make them up.” Nonetheless,
that is what the court does in the Gray case.
The court takes this unusual step, I believe, because
it realizes there is a difference between cases where
the entire tort, negligent act and consequences, occurs
in the forum state, and cases where the negligent act
occurs outside the state and only the consequences
occur in the forum. Generally, cases where the act
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occurs outside and only the injury happens inside will
involve many fewer contacts with the forum by the
defendant than when both act and consequences occur
inside the forum. The court in Gray seems comfortable
saying jurisdiction exists in “act without, consequences
within” cases only when there are some significant
additional contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum. As you will see, later cases and
state long-arm statutes pick up on this point and allow
jurisdiction in “act without, consequences within”
cases only when such additional contacts exist.
The court ends by citing several other factors that
make assertion of jurisdiction in Illinois reasonable.
What are those factors?
(Illinois plaintiff suffered the injury; Illinois law will
govern the substantive tort issues as a matter of horizontal choice of law; Illinois the most convenient
forum since witnesses and other proof likely to be
located in Illinois.)

d
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